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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE SYDNEY KINGSFORD-SMITH Airport in Australia' be-gan its life as a commercial passenger handling airport in
1921 when the Commonwealth government acquired the Mas-
cot Aerodrome as part of a program to develop a nationwide
airport network in Australia.' Today, Sydney Kingsford-Smith
Airport is Australia's busiest3 and the world's thirty-first busiest
airport.4 The Sydney-Melbourne air route is the fifth busiest in
the world.5 Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport is a primary hub for
I To distinguish the existing Sydney Airport in discussions below regarding a
potential second Sydney airport, the existing airport is hereafter referred to as
Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport.
2 SYDNEY AIRPORT CORP., SYDNEY AIRPORT ENVIRONMENT STRATEGY 2010-2015,
at 11-12 (2009), available at http://www.sydneyairport.com.au/investors/-/me-
dia/files/corporate/environment%20plan/policy%20and%20strategy/enviros-
tratgy102015.pdf.
3BUREAU OF INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSP. & REG'L ECON., MONTHLY AIRPORT
TRAFFIc DATA FOR Top TWENTY AIRPORTS: JANUARY 2009 TO CURRENT, (2014),
available at http://www.bitre.gov.au/publications/ongoing/airport-trafficdata.
aspx.
4 PORT AUTH. OF N.Y. & N.J., 2013 AIRPORT TRAFFIC REPORT 32 tbl. 2.1.2
(2014), available at http://www.panynj.gov/airports/pdf-traffic/ATR2013.pdf.
5 Press Release, Amadeus, Seven Out of Ten of the World's Busiest Inter-City
Routes Are Within Asia as the Region Leads Global Travel Growth (May 8, 2012),
available at http://www.amadeus.com/amadeus/x221301.html; Press Release,
Amadeus, 300 World 'Super Routes' Attract 20% of All Air Travel, Amadeus
Reveals (Apr. 16, 2013), available at http://www.amadeus.com/web/amadeus/
en_US-US/Amadeus-Home/News-and-events/News/041713-300-world-super-
routes/i 259071352352-Page-AMAD DetailPpal?assetid=1 319526535668&asset-
type=PressReleaseC.
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Australia's largest air carrier, Qantas Airways.' It is also the only
major airport serving Sydney and the only airport providing in-
ternational air service in the State of New South Wales (NSW).
It is a critical piece of national transport infrastructure and, as
Australia's major international gateway, the first point of call for
many overseas visitors to Australia.8
Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport has hosted aviation activities
for a long period of time.9 This has meant that the city itself has
grown out from-rather than out to-the airport. 0 Thus, Syd-
ney Kingsford-Smith Airport is "set amid densely populated ur-
ban areas, relatively close to the city centre of Sydney.""
However, the convenience of that central location, coupled with
the post-war urban sprawl that has occurred, also means that
Sydney is an airport with no more room to grow.
Indeed, the story of Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport is a mi-
crocosm of the key legal, policy, and regulatory problems that
many major airports face today. A detailed examination of the
issues facing Sydney touches on slot management, infrastructure
investment and capacity, noise, community consultation, envi-
ronmental concerns, airport curfews, regional access, airport
competition, and the use of market power.
In the context of these issues, the debate regarding the con-
struction of a second Sydney airport-which has gone on since
1946-has recently resurfaced. 1 2 The catalyst for this was the ex-
tremely detailed and extensive Joint Study on Aviation Capacity
in the Sydney Region (Joint Study) commissioned by the Com-
monwealth and NSW governments, which was released in March
6 DESTINATION NSW, MEDIA INFORMATION ATE 2 (2012), available at http://
www.destinationnsw.com.au/_data/assets/pdf-file/0018/190512/ATE-Air-Ca-
pacity-media-FS.pdf.
7 STEERING COMM., DEP'T OF INFRASTRUCTURE & REG'L DEV., COMMONWEALTH
OF AUSTL., JOINT STUDY ON AVIATION CAPACITY IN THE SYDNEY REGION 3, 100
(2012) [hereinafter JOINT STUDY].
8 SYDNEY AIRPORT CORP., Supra note 2, at 13.
9 See id. at 11-12.
10 SeeJoINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 45 fig. 10.
I AuSTL. NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SYDNEY AIRPORT DE-
MAND MANAGEMENT AcT 1997, at 13 (2007).
12 See PAULA WILLIAMS & NICHOLAS O'SULLIVAN, DEP'T OF THE PARLIAMENTARY
LIBRARY, COMMONWEALTH OF AuSTL., SECOND SYDNEY AIRPORT-A CHRONOLOGY,
at i, 1 (2002). The Parliamentary Library of Australia has published detailed chro-
nologies of the Second Sydney Airport debate. Id.; see also Matthew L. James, Sec-




38 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [ 79
2012.13 The Joint Study was in turn foreshadowed by the Com-
monwealth government's National Aviation Policy White Paper,
released in December 2009."
This article examines the legal, policy, and regulatory issues
for Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport through the prism of the
second Sydney airport debate and through the release of the
Joint Study. This article also outlines the post-privatization legis-
lative and regulatory regime that all major Australian airports
are subject to and offers some background to the Joint Study.
The article also looks at the specific regulatory regime in
place for Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport as well as the
problems that this regime has created. Finally, the article exam-
ines the options for addressing Sydney's aviation infrastructure
capacity issues that are put forward by the Joint Study. The arti-
cle does not seek to provide a definitive answer on this matter.
Countless reports and scoping studies have already clearly laid
out the answers. Instead, the paper aims to provide a cautionary
tale of airport privatization and regulation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. PRIVATIZATION
In April 1994, the Commonwealth government announced in
a White Paper on Employment and Growth its "intention, in
principle, to sell [its] airports."" In preparation for that event,
the Airports Act was passed by the Commonwealth parliament
in October 1996.16 " [T]he Airports Act established the regula-
tory framework that would apply to airports after the sales were
completed, including provisions dealing with foreign
ownership."' 7
13 See generally JOINT STUDY, supra note 7.
14 See generally DEP'T OF INFRASTRUCTURE & REG'L DEV., COMMONWEALTH OF
AusTL., NATIONAL AVIATION POLICY WHITE PAPER (2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL
AVIATION POLICY WHITE PAPER], available at http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/avi-
ation/publications/pdf/AviationWhitePaper-final.pdf.
15 Paul Hooper et al., The Privatisation of Australia's Airports, 36 TRANSP. REs.
PART E 181, 191 tbl. 5 (2000). The decision to sell all of the federally leased
airports was considered a bold step at the time (with only the United Kingdom
(UK) electing to pursue a similar program of privatization). See ORG. FOR ECON.
Coop. & DEV. [OECD], STRATEGIC TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS To 2030, at
160 (2012), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264114425-en.
16 Airports Act 1996 (Cth) (Austl.).
17 Hooper et al., supra note 15, at 190.
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The twenty-two Commonwealth government-owned airports
were sold in three separate tranches between 1997 and 2003.18
They were sold via fifty-year lease agreements (with the option
to extend the lease a further forty-nine years) between the Com-
monwealth government as lessor and the airport operators as
lessees.19 The first tranche, which included Melbourne, Bris-
bane, and Perth Airports, was sold in May 1997.20
The second tranche, which consisted of all other airports ex-
cept those in the Sydney region, was sold in 1998.21 Sydney
Kingsford-Smith Airport's sale was excluded from these earlier
tranches "pending the resolution of noise issues over Sydney
and the completion of an environmental impact study for the
proposed second Sydney airport at Badgerys Creek."2 2
Following a competitive tender process, Sydney Airports Cor-
poration Limited (SACL), the company holding the long-term
lease over the Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport site, was sold to
Southern Cross Airports Corporation Pty Limited (a corpora-
tion wholly owned by Australia's Macquarie Bank) for a
purchase price of AUD $4.233 billion. The SACL purchase
price was significantly higher than the next highest bid, was the
largest airport trade sale worldwide to that date, and was the
most valuable single trade sale by the Commonwealth
government.24
The high purchase price paid by SACL was a product of some
key concessions made by the Commonwealth government dur-
ing the sale process, chief among which was "that the new owner
of Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport would be given the first
right of refusal to build and operate any major airport within
100 kilometres of the Sydney Central Business District."2 5 The
SACL final sale agreement granted that right for a period of
is Id. at 191-95.
19 PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., ECoNOMIC REGULATION
OF AIRPORT SERVICES 23 (2011).
20 Hooper et al., supra note 15, at 191 tbl. 5.
21 Id. at 194.
22 Id. at 191 tbl. 5.
23 AUSTL. NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE, THE SALE OF SYDNEY (KINGSFORD SMITH) AIR-
PORT 9 (2003).
24 Id. at 10. The Australian National Audit Office assessed the purchase price
as a "very good financial outcome for the Commonwealth [government]." Id. at
50.
25 Id. at 29.
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thirty years after the sale.2 6 At the same time, provisions regard-
ing the ownership of both Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport and a
future "Sydney West Airport" were included in the Airports
Act.2 7 These provisions continue to impact the second Sydney
airport debate.
B. THE REGULATORY REGIME APPLIED TO NEWLY PRIVATIZED
AuSTRAiAN AIRPORTS
1. Movement from Price Caps to Monitoring and Access Regimes
With the transfer from public to private ownership, the Com-
monwealth government recognized that airports, as natural mo-
nopolies, held significant market power and, as a result, needed
to be subject to some form of price regulation.2 8 Prior to priva-
tization, the charges levied by the Federal Airports Corpora-
tion" "were subject to surveillance and monitoring by the Prices
Surveillance Authority (PSA)."o
From 1997 until 2002, the government applied a regime of
price cap regulation and monitoring of airports' service quality
under the relevant provisions of the Airports Act." After a 2002
review of the price regulation of airport services conducted by
the Productivity Commission (PC),32 the Commonwealth gov-
ernment removed the price controls and replaced them with
light-handed monitoring by the Australian Competition and
26 Case Study on Commercialization, Privatization and Economic Oversight of Airports
and Air Navigation Services Providers, ICAO, http://www.icao.int/sustainability/
casestudies/Australia.pdf (last updated Jan. 7, 2013).
27 See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
28 See PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, supra note 19, at 66. The Productivity Commis-
sion notes that "[n]atural monopolies often occur in industries that are domi-
nated by high capital (or 'fixed') costs, resulting in economies of scale." Id.
29 Established by an Act of Parliament in 1987, the Federal Airports Corpora-
tion (FAC) was a Commonwealth government business enterprise formed in
1988 responsible for the operation of Australia's major passenger airports.
Hooper et al., supra note 15, at 182. As part of the privatization process, in 1998,
all significant assets and liabilities of the FAC were transferred to the individual
new airport lessee companies. Id. at 190.
30 Id. at 182.
31 PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, supra note 19, at xxi. Moreover, "[t]he [Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission] reports on service quality of the air-
ports under the provisions of Part 8 of the Airports Act, drawing on information
from airports, airlines, passengers, and border agencies." Id. at xxii.
32 The Productivity Commission is an independent statutory research and advi-
sory body that covers a range of economic, social, and environmental issues af-
fecting the welfare of Australians. A Quick Guide to the Productivity Commission,
PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, http://www.pc.gov.au/about-us/quick-guide (last visited
May 22, 2014).
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Consumer Commission (ACCC) of aeronautical services at the
major Australian airports, including the newly privatized Sydney
Kingsford-Smith airport." The light-handed monitoring regime
remains in place today. 4
In addition to the light-handed monitoring regime under Part
VIIA of the Competition and Consumer Act (CCA), "Part IIIA of
the CCA provides for a national [third-party] access regime so as
to enable competition in industries dependent upon access to
monopoly infrastructure."3 5 The Part IIIA and National Compe-
tition Policy" legislative process ran almost parallel to the air-
port privatization process, with the legislation "seek[ing] to
promote the efficient operation of, use of and investment in mo-
nopoly infrastructure. The [Part IIIA] regime provides for ac-
cess to the services of infrastructure facilities on appropriate
terms, through the declaration of services."
Declaration of a service is obtained through an application to
the National Competition Council (NCC); the NCC then
3 PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, supra note 19, at xxi.
3 Id. at xxi-xxii ("Provisions in Part VIIA of the Competition and Consumer
Act (CCA) and the Airports Act provide for the ACCC to monitor the prices,
costs and financial returns relating to the supply of aeronautical and related ser-
vices at designated airports. Relevant services include: aircraft movements; pas-
senger processing, including security; landside vehicle access; and car parking.
Retail, rental, and business park activities are not monitored under the 'dual till'
approach.").
3 Stephen C. Littlechild, Australian Airport Regulation: Exploring the Frontier, 21
J. AIR TRANSPORT MGMT. 50, 51 (2012).
36 The National Competition Policy was a microeconomic reform measure in-
troduced in 1995 after the publication of the report of the independent Committee
of Inquiry into a National Competition Policy (known as the Hilmer Report). About the
National Competition Policy, NAT'L COMPETITION COUNCIL, http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/
pages/about (last visited May 22, 2014). A key principle of the program was that
competitive markets will generally best serve the interests of consumers and the
wider community. Id. The Policy aimed to bring competition and competitive
market principles to a number of industry sectors. Id.
37 About Us, NAT'L COMPETITION COUNCIL, http://www.ncc.gov.au/index.php/
about/aboutus (last visited May 21, 2014). Alternatively,
[u]nder Part IIIA of the CCA, an infrastructure provider may vol-
untarily submit a proposed access undertaking to the ACCC, setting
out the terms and conditions of access for third parties. The aim of
the undertaking is to provide owners/operators of infrastructure
facilities . . . with an opportunity to remove any uncertainty as to
the access conditions that will apply to those services. An undertak-
ing is an alternative to declaration. If an undertaking is accepted by
the ACCC, the service in question cannot be declared, and vice
versa.
PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, supra note 19, at 28.
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"makes a recommendation to the Minister as to whether a ser-
vice should be declared. The provider of a declared service must
attempt to negotiate mutually acceptable terms and conditions
of access with an access seeker. If negotiations fail, there is provi-
sion for arbitration by the ACCC.""8 Since the commencement
of the Part IIIA provisions in 1995, a number of access cases
have been brought before the courts and the Australian Compe-
tition Tribunal in relation to Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport.39
2. The Airports Act
As noted above, "the Airports Act established the regulatory
framework that would apply to [Commonwealth government-
owned] airports" after their privatization. 4 0 However, the Air-
ports Act also "created an overarching system to govern airport
activity," including:
* site usage obligations stipulating that the "airport site must
be used as an airport" and the operator must not "carry on
substantial non-airport trading or financial activities nor
undertake sensitive development";
* the establishment of twenty-year master plans (subject to
Ministerial approval and updated every five years) setting
out the airport lessee's proposals for operation, invest-
ment, and infrastructure development at the airport site;
* the provision of major development plans, also subject to
Ministerial approval;
* the establishment of demand management schemes; and
* ancillary requirements such as "environmental and safety
regulations[,] international obligations[,] and standards
for preparing audited accounts and reports."4 1
38 Littlechild, supra note 35, at 51.
39 PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, supra note 19, at 29 ("In 1996, Australian Cargo Ter-
minal Operators brought multiple applications to declare ramp and certain
other freight-related services at Melbourne and Sydney airports. The ramp access
applications were later withdrawn. However, the other freight-related services at
Melbourne airport were declared for 12 months from July 1997 (where the ser-
vices then became subject to the access provisions of the Airports Act). Addition-
ally, the 'other freight-related services' at Sydney airport were declared for a
period of five years from 1 March 2000. And in 2002, the then Virgin Blue sought
access to various services at Sydney airport. Domestic airside services were de-
clared in 2005 for a period of five years."); see also Virgin Blue Airlines Pty Ltd.
[2005] ACompT 5 (Austl.); Sydney Airport Corp. v Austl. Competition Tribunal
[2006] FCAFC 146 (Austl.).
40 Hooper et al., supra note 15, at 190 (emphasis omitted).
41 PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, supra note 19, at 22.
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The Airports Act also states that "Sydney West Airport is taken
to be an airport" from the development and planning stage12
and constitutes a "core regulated airport." 4 3 Additionally, sec-
tion 18 of the Airports Act confirms the condition of sale of the
lease for Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport on its privatization: the
owner of that lease would also own the lease to Sydney West
Airport.44
As can be seen, the regulation of major airports in Australia,
while light-handed in some respects, covers a broad range of
microeconomic, financial, and urban planning considerations.
III. THE SECOND SYDNEY AIRPORT JOINT STUDY
Seeking to draw the proverbial "line in the sand" regarding
the second Sydney airport debate and aviation capacity in the
Sydney region more generally, the Commonwealth government,
in conjunction with the NSW government, initiated the Joint
Study in 2009."6 While the Joint Study "started with a clean
sheet," it sought to examine "the future demand for aviation in
the Sydney region, how that relates to the growth of the popula-
tion and economic activity in the region, and how an integrated
aviation, surface transport, and land development strategy can
be developed and implemented over time."" In doing so, the
Joint Study acknowledged at the outset that there was a looming
aviation capacity issue in the Sydney region that needed to be
addressed.
As noted in the introduction to this article, a number of regu-
latory and policy settings (as set out in Commonwealth legisla-
tion) apply to Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport specifically and
42 Airports Act 1996 (Cth) s 6 (Austl.).
4 Id. s 7.
44 Id. s 18.
4 JOINT STUDY, supra note 7, at vi.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 147. The Joint Study considered that " [b]y 2035 there is unlikely to be
any usable capacity available at Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport" and that
"[thirty] movements of peak hour demand per day (or [27% of the busiest daily
peak hour demand]) [would] not be met" by the same year. Id. at 147, 149. It
should also be noted that with the exception of Sydney Airport Corporation Lim-
ited, the owner of Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport, there is broad political and
academic consensus that a second Sydney airport is required. See Sydney Airport
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not to other major Australian airports.48 This legislation and its
accompanying regulations "affect [Sydney Kingsford-Smith Air-
port]'s ability to operate at its full capacity." 49 These regulations
include the demand management system, curfews, and the re-
gional ring fence.o Concerns regarding the potential misuse of
market power can be added to this mix, given Sydney Kingsford-
Smith Airport's monopoly infrastructure.
The Joint Study also examines these regulations to see if there
are any potential measures available to reduce existing capacity
constraints at Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport.52 Separate from
this, the Joint Study also takes a fresh look at the issue of where a
second Sydney airport should be located.5 3 The existing regula-
tory regime's problems, their potential solutions, and the sec-
ond Sydney airport issue are addressed below.
IV. THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY DEREGULATION AND
RE-REGULATION
A. MARKET POWER CONCERNS
As already noted, at the time of privatization, the Common-
wealth government recognized that some major airports in Aus-
tralia held significant market power and therefore needed to be
subject to some form of economic regulation.5 4 The concern re-
garding market power relates to its potential misuse. 5 In its
2011 Inquiry Report into the Economic Regulation of Airport
Services, the Productivity Commission listed the potential conse-
quences of an airport's misuse of its market power as follows:
First, an airport with market power could seek to raise prices for
its services above economically efficient levels. In doing so, the
airport would effectively lower the consumption of its services
and "deadweight losses" (the benefit that consumers would have
gained if they had used the airport at the competitive price)
48 See supra Part I.
4 JOINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 212.
50 Id.
51 PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, supra note 19, at 70-71.
52 JoINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 217, 367-68.
53 Id. at 281-83.
54 See supra Part II.B.1.
55 Misuse of market power is an offense under section 46 of the CCA. See Com-
petition & Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 46 (Austl.). Misuse of market power is similar
to the concept of "abuse of a dominant position" in other jurisdictions, but it
involves a lower threshold. See Misuse of Market Power, AUSTL. COMPETITION & CON-
SUMER COMM'N, http://www.accc.gov.au/business/anti-competitive-behaviour/
misuse-of-market-power (last visited May 22, 2014).
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would ensue. Second, an airport with market power could, while
maintaining prices, allow quality to fall, for example by reducing
staffing levels, using cheaper inputs or replacing plant and equip-
ment less frequently. This would also have the effect of reducing
consumption as, at the margin, some consumers would be unwill-
ing to pay the same price for the lower quality service.. .. Third,
lack of competitive pressures could enable a firm to operate inef-
ficiently by allowing its costs to rise or by it not adopting cost-
saving or innovative technologies."
The key phrase in the text above is "lack of competitive pres-
sures." Where there are no competitive constraints on an air-
port's operations-for example, one competitive constraint
would be the existence of a neighboring airport also offering
regular public transport (RPT) services"-the potential for an
airport to misuse its market power significantly increases. The
competition dynamic in Australia's next largest cities, Mel-
bourne and Brisbane, is differentiated by the existence of alter-
native second airports providing RPT services at Avalon and the
Gold Coast, respectively.58
The Commonwealth government's 2002 decision to sell Syd-
ney Kingsford-Smith Airport as a standalone piece of geographic
monopoly infrastructure-along with the move to light-handed
regulation by way of a price monitoring regime-created the
conditions for the potential misuse of market power by the air-
port's new private sector owners.59 This problem is exacerbated
by the Commonwealth government's additional decision to pro-
vide in the Sydney Kingsford-Smith airport sale agreement a
condition that the owners of the airport would have a thirty-year
right of first refusal over the development, construction, and op-
eration of a second airport within 100 kilometers of the Sydney
CBD.60 As it stands, if the right is exercised6 1 and a second air-
port is built within the Sydney basin by the owners of Sydney
56 PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, supra note 19, at 70-71.
57 RPT services are defined as "regular passenger services for financial reward."
Id. at 9.
58 See id. at xxiii. Although note that Avalon Airport (approximately seventy
kilometers southwest of Melbourne) currently only serves six domestic arrivals
and departures per day and does not currently host international flights, al-
though its lease conditions were recently amended to enable the building of an
international terminal. Id. at 78; Press Release, Commonwealth of Austl., Avalon
Airport Progresses Towards International Services (Apr. 22, 2013), available at
http://www.newsgrab.com/infrastructure-/ 14703-avalon-airport-progresses-
toward-international-services.
59 See PRODUCTIVITY COMM'N, supra note 19, at xxi-xxii.
-o AusTL. NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE, supra note 23, at 21-22.
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Kingsford-Smith Airport before 2032, the capacity concerns at
Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport will dissipate, but the concerns
over the misuse of market power will not.6 2
B. CAPACITY CONCERNS
While the potential misuse of market power is a particular
concern for Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport, it is not exclusive
to that airport-the concern also exists with respect to other ma-
jor Australian airports. Australia's vast distances mean that the
major airports in each state have the characteristics of geo-
graphic monopolies, each with varying degrees of market power
and varying degrees of potential to misuse that market power.
As Australia's largest airport by passenger numbers and given its
urban, central location, however, Sydney Kingsford-Smith Air-
port has for some time been subject to additional levels of regu-
lation. These include legislation and regulations in relation to
slot management, aircraft movements, and curfews.
1. Slot Management and the Cap on Aircraft Movements
In 1996, as part of an election promise, the incoming govern-
ment made a commitment to limit the number of aircraft move-
61 The owners of Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport currently have no incentive
to exercise this right (as they would prefer to maintain their existing monopoly
without having to spend more money). See Lenore Taylor, Albanese Kick-Starts Air-
port at Wilton, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.smh.com.
au/opinion/political-news/albanese-kickstarts-airport-at-wilton-20 1 204 1 1-1wsd0.
html.
62 In the UK, when privatized in 1986, the British Airports Authority (BAA)
had responsibility for and ownership of the three major London area airports of
Heathrow, Gatwick, and Stansted, as well as Glasgow International Airport, Edin-
burgh, Southampton, and Aberdeen Airports. COMPETITION COMM'N, BAA AiR-
PORTS MARKET INVESTIGATION 8, 130 (2009), available at http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/assets/competitioncommission/docs/pdf/non-inquiry/rep
pub/reports/2009/fulltext/545.pdf. Following an inquiry process between 2007
and 2009, in March 2009, the UK Competition Commission handed down a re-
port that, among other recommendations, required BAA to divest three of the
seven UK airports it owned at the time due to the competition problems that
monopoly ownership of those airports created; those airports were both Gatwick
and Stansted in London, and either Edinburgh or Glasgow Airport in Scotland.
Id. at 4, 17. BAA subsequently sold Gatwick Airport in December 2009, Edin-
burgh Airport in April 2012, and Stansted Airport in February 2013. Stansted Deal
Completes BAA Sell Off COMPETITION COMM'N (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.compe-
tition-commission.org.uk/media-centre/latest-news/2013/jan/stansted-deal-
completes-baa-sell-off.
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ments at Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport." The Sydney Airport
Demand Management Act (SADMA), 6 which became effective
in March 1998, prescribes a maximum of eighty aircraft move-
ments in any hour (except during the curfew period, when the
curfew provisions take effect).'6
In the second reading speech for the legislation, the Com-
monwealth Parliament was advised that the demand manage-
ment arrangements would:
* help alleviate delays caused by congestion at Sydney Kings-
ford-Smith Airport;
* spread aircraft movements more evenly within hours;
* safeguard the level of access that regional NSW has to Syd-
ney Kingsford-Smith Airport;
* provide any potential new entrants with equal access to
slots at Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport; and
* ensure a workable and effective means of administering
the movement limit.6 6
The movement cap provided for under the SADMA is accom-
panied by a slot management scheme6 1 that includes:
grandfathering provisions on rights to slots; a "use it or lose it"
test; and details on applying, allocating, and swapping slots.6 8
The slot management scheme is administered by Airport Coor-
dination Australia (ACA), established in 1998 as an indepen-
dent Slot Manager (for the purposes of SADMA) to allocate
movement slots.69
As the Joint Study notes,
63 Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 Sept. 1997
(Michael Ronaldson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Transport and
Regional Development) (Austl.).
64 Sydney Airport Demand Management Act 1997 (Cth) (Austl.).
65 Id. s 6(1). The Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport curfew is discussed in greater
detail below. See infra Part IV.B.3.
66 Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 25 Sept. 1997, 8536
(Michael Ronaldson, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Transport and
Regional Development) (Austl.).
67 Sydney Airport Slot Management Scheme 2013 (Cth) (Austl.). This replaced the
Slot Management Scheme 1998.
68 Id. ss 7, 11-20.
69 Slot Management at Sydney Airport, DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE & RE-
GIONAL DEv., http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/airport/planning/apr
slots.aspx (last visited May 22, 2014). ACA is 90% owned by airlines (Qantas 40%,
Virgin Australia 35%, the Regional Aviation Association of Australia 15%) and
10% owned by Sydney Airport Corporation Limited. Petra Krolke, Sydney Airport
Slot Coordination, REGIONAL AVIATION Ass'N OF AUSTL., http://www.raaa.com.au/
convention/2011 /presentations/Session10.html (last visited May 22, 2014).
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[T] he movement cap and slot allocation system are intrinsically
linked. The [SADMA] sets a cap of [eighty] movements per hour
on the runway and requires that the slot management scheme is
consistent with the runway movement cap. In effect, this means
that [eighty] is the maximum for both the runway movements
and slot allocation.o
It also means that under the scheme, "[a]ll commercial and pri-
vate aircraft require a 'slot' to land at or take off from Sydney
Airport." 7 1
Slot allocation is a complex process that, for international air-
ports, must fit within a worldwide structure and take into ac-
count curfews and peak periods at other airports. It is also
driven to an extent by passenger traffic patterns and preferences
in terms of travel times. Slots at Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport
are currently allocated and managed under the slot manage-
ment scheme and in accordance with the International Air
Transport Association's (IATA) Worldwide Slot Guidelines. 72
The introduction of a slot management system usually consti-
tutes recognition that the demand for take-off and landing slots
is outstripping available supply.73 Artificial caps (whether hourly
movement caps or curfews for specific periods) on aircraft
movements only serve to exacerbate capacity constraints. An-
other unintended consequence of such caps is that certain peak-
period take-off and landing slots become highly coveted com-
modities for airlines due to high demand and scarce availability.
These trends have been demonstrated by a number of secon-
dary market sales of slots at London Heathrow Airport74 and in
the United States, where slot pairs at Reagan Washington Na-
tional Airport and New York La Guardia Airport were auctioned
after they were divested by US Airways and Delta Airlines as part
70 JoINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 212.
71 Slot Management at Sydney Airport, supra note 69.
72 IATA, WORLDWIDE SLOT GUIDELINES (5th ed. 2013). However, the Guide-
lines note that to the extent "that some States or Regions may also have regula-
tions governing some of these issues[,] ... those regulations will have precedence
over the policies, principles and processes of the[ ] guidelines." Id. at 1.
73 At the very least, demand would be exceeding supply during certain peak
periods of the day.
74 See Kevin Done, Continental Pays Heathrow Record, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2008),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b6a47274-e955-l1dc-8365-0000779fd2ac.html
#axzz2h9j56ukB ("Continental Airlines . . . has paid a record $209m for four
pairs of take-off and landing slots at London Heathrow airport.").
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of a slot swap agreement.7 5 Increasingly, airlines holding the
slots are recognizing the financial value of those slots and are
defining the slots as assets on their balance sheets.16 Indeed,
there is a line of thought developing among government regula-
tors that airport slots may be the type of economic product that
is best dealt with by market-driven measures such as auctions.
However, the point here is that a slot management system fails
to address the underlying problem, which is the lack of neces-
sary aviation infrastructure. IATA recognizes this, stating in a po-
sition paper on airport capacity that slot allocation is "only an
interim solution to manage congested infrastructure until the
longer term solution of expanding airport capacity is
implemented."7
2. Aircraft Size and Regional Service Obligations
The Sydney Airport Slot Management Scheme (SASMS) 7 9 also
incorporates a "regional ring fence" in its provisions, which ef-
fectively creates a separate pool for regional slot users called a
"permanent regional service series."80 The ring fence ensures
that as long as they are conducted in accordance with any "size
of aircraft" requirement applied to the slot, regional services will
75 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., JetBlue, WestJet Gain Slots at La-
Guardia, Reagan National Airports (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.dot.gov/briefing-
room/jetblue-westjet-gain-slots-laguardia-reagan-national-airports (noting that
JetBlue and Westjet were the successful bidders for slots at Reagan National and
LaGuardia).
76 UK Airlines Start to Value Landing Slots as Assets on Balance Sheets, DELOITTE,
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en-gb/uk/969833d0303fb110VgnVCM100000ba
42f0OaRCRD.htm (last visited May 22, 2014). While not slot-constrained to such
an extent that a secondary market has developed for its slots, this may change for
Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport in the near future, especially with regard to the
peak-period slots.
77 See Benjamin D. Williams, Comment, Playing the Slots: The FAA Gambles with
Its Controversial Congestion Management Plan for New York's Busiest Airports, 74 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 437, 439 (2009); Kenneth Button, Auctions-What Can We Learn from
Auction Theory for Slot Allocation?, in AIRPORT SLOTS: INTERNATIONAL ExPERIENCES
AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 291, 295-307 (Achim I. Czerny et al. eds., 2008); see
also Richard Janda, Auctioning Airport Slots: Airline Oligopoly, Hubs and Spokes, and
Traffic Congestion, XVIII-1 ANN. AIR & SPACE L. 153, 184-94 (1993); NERA ECON.
CONSULTING, STUDY TO ASSESS THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT SLOT ALLOCATION
SCHEMES (2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/studies/doc/air-
ports/2004_01_slotallocationschemes.pdf.
78 Managing Scarce Airport Capacity: Airport Slots & Worldwide Slot Guidelines
(WSG) IATA, http://www.iata.org/policy/slots/Documents/position-paper-slots.
pdf (last visited May 19, 2014).
79 Sydney Airport Slot Management Scheme 2013 (Cth) (Austl.).
so Id. s 6.
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be maintained at-but not increased beyond-their 2001
levels."
For the purposes of the SASMS, a slot series is defined as a
permanent regional service series if "the equivalent slot series in
the previous equivalent scheduling season was a permanent re-
gional service series under [the SASMS]" 8 2 or under its prede-
cessor, the Slot Management Scheme 1998." Many of the slot
series at Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport are subject to size-of-
aircraft requirements.8 4 When applied in conjunction with the
size-of-aircraft test, an aircraft operator must use aircraft that sat-
isfy the size-of-aircraft requirement for at least 80% of the slots
in the slot series. 5
The Joint Study notes that "[t] he regional ring fence provi-
sions limit the scope for the holder of a protected regional slot
to swap an intrastate service for an interstate domestic or inter-
national service."8 6 Further, the study notes that "the provisions
limit the right of a new operator to take up a currently unused
protected regional slot and use it for ongoing interstate or inter-
national services."8 7 This is where the protected or separate pool
element comes in. Without the limitations on slot swapping and
using unused slots, "operators of interstate or international ser-
vices could progressively obtain access to more and more slots,
to the gradual exclusion of NSW intrastate services.""
The problem with a regional ring fence is that it results in the
inefficient allocation of slot capacity. Peak-period slots for re-
gional NSW services are operated by aircraft ranging anywhere
from eighteen to eighty seats.8 9 In comparison, the standard air-
craft flown on domestic trunk routes (and that might otherwise
81 JOINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 220-21. In order to maintain slots ring-fenced
for regional services, the "use it or lose it" test under section 9 of the SASMS does
not apply. Sydney Airport Slot Management Scheme 2013 (Cth) s 9 (Austl.).
82 Sydney Airport Slot Management Scheme 2013 (Cth) s 6(1) (a) (AustI.).
83 Id. s 6(1)(b).
84 Id. s 8.
85 Id.
86 JOINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 219.
87 Id.
8 Id.
89 See id. at 220 tbl. 28. Regional Express Airlines (Rex), Australia's largest in-
dependent regional airline, operates the most regional (or intrastate New South
Wales) services at Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport. Sydney Airport Price Notification
for Regional Air Services, REGIONAL ExPREss (July 30, 2010), http://www.rex.com.
au/NewspaperClip/SubmittedDos/Rex%20submission%20to%20Sydney%20
Airport%20price%20notification%20on%20Regional%20Air%20Services
%202010.pdf. Rex's fleet consists primarily of Saab 340s, in 34-seat configura-
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be used in those peak-period slots) are the Boeing 737 and the
Airbus A320, which often feature configurations of up to 180
seats.o Additionally, regional services from Sydney Kingsford-
Smith Airport are subject to price caps on their airport charges
(including charges relating to regional service peak-period
slots), meaning that Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport is only able
to increase prices at the level of the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) each year.91
The regional ring fence under the SASMS essentially frus-
trates the aims of demand and capacity management at Sydney
Kingsford-Smith Airport. It undermines the operation of the
"use it or lose it" rule upon which the rest of the slot manage-
ment scheme and the IATA Worldwide Slot Guidelines are
based and contributes to the wider capacity problem at Sydney
Kingsford-Smith Airport through its distortive effects on the effi-
cient allocation of capacity.
3. The Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport Curfew
Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport, like an increasing number of
airports worldwide, is subject to nighttime flight restrictions.9 2
The curfew at Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport began in 1963 in
tions. See Our Company-Company Highlights, REGIONAL ExPREss, http://www.rex.
com.au/AboutRex/OurCompany/fleet.aspx (last visited May 22, 2014).
90 JOINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 278 tbl. 42. In its submission to the National
Aviation Policy Statement Issues Paper, Sydney Airport Corporation noted that
aircraft with fewer than eighteen seats had been grandfathered into the Scheme
and can continue to use Sydney Airport. See SYDNEY AIRPORT CORP., TOwARDS A
NATIONAL AVIATION POLICY STATEMENT: ISSUES PAPER 19 (2008), available at http:/
/www.infrastructureaustralia.gov.au/public submissions/published/files/109_
sydney-airportSUB2.pdf. Also, the Joint Study notes that
[i]n 2010, there was an average of 30 passengers per movement for
regional flights, compared to around 140 passengers per move-
ment for domestic flights and 185 passengers per movement for
international flights. Consequently, notwithstanding the propor-
tion of allocated slots, regional flights accounted for only about
[6%] of total Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport passengers.
JOINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 219-20.
91 Direction No. 34 Pursuant to Section 95ZH of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
(Austl.).




The situation varies widely across the regions. In Africa, Asia/Pa-
cific, and Latin America and the Caribbean, only [1%] of all air-
ports open to scheduled air traffic imposed some sort of night
flight restrictions. The proportion increases to [4% and 5%] re-
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response to the noise of early types of jet aircraft.9" The Sydney
Airport Curfew Act (SACA) 94 subsequently codified the 11:00
p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew in 1995." While the SACA does not
stop all aircraft movements overnight, it does limit take-offs and
landings between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. by restricting the
types of aircraft that can operate, the runways they can use, and
the number of flights allowed."6 Passenger jet flights are usually
"not allowed in and out of Sydney Airport overnight.""
Flights that are allowed overnight include small propeller-
driven aircraft,98 "low noise" jets that meet weight and noise re-
quirements, 9 and a limited number of freight aircraft."oo Addi-
tionally, some international passenger jet movements are
allowed to take off from or land at Sydney Kingsford-Smith Air-
port between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, or land between 5:00
a.m. and 6:00 a.m. (times known as the curfew "shoulder peri-
ods") if they meet noise level restrictions, land or take off from
specified runways, and receive approval from the Secretary of
the Department of Transport.101 The Regulations prescribe
lower movement limits than those originally enacted in the
SACA. 02
For passenger aircraft seeking to take off from Sydney Airport
between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, this therefore leaves the
grant of a dispensation by the Minister under section 20 of the
spectively for Middle East and North America [airports, and] to
[12%] for airports in Europe.
Night Flight Restrictions 2 (Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Working Paper No. ATConf/6-
WP/8, 2013), available at http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/
WorkingPapers/ATConf6-wpOO8-reven.pdf.
93 SYDNEY AIRPORT CORP., supra note 92, at 29.
9 Sydney Airport Curfew Act 1995 (Cth) (Austl.).
95 Id. s 6.
96 Id. ss 7, 12.
97 Airport Curfews-General Information, DEPARTMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE & RE-
GIONAL DEv., http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/environmental/pdf/air-
port-curfews-general-informationfact_sheet.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014).
98 Sydney Airport Cur Act 1995 (Cth) s 14 (Austl.).
9 Id. s 15.
100 Id. s 13.
101 Id. s 12.
102 Sydney Airport Curfew Regulations 1995 (Cth) reg 6-7 (Austl.). Take-offs and
landings (taken together) were reduced from a maximum of fourteen per week
and four per day between 11:00 p.m. and midnight to a complete ban and from a
maximum thirty-five landings per week and seven per day to a maximum of
twenty-four per week and five per day from 5:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. Id.; Sydney
Airport Curfew Act 1995 (Cth) s 12(8)-(9) (Austl.).
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SACA as one of the only options available.10 3 According to the
current Guidelines for the Granting of Dispensations, to be consid-
ered exceptional, circumstances must generally be:
* "of immediate origin";
* "of such a character that they could not reasonably have
been foreseen"; and
* "not reasonably able to be met by alternative arrange-
ments."'0o
Dispensations under section 20 of the SACA are rarely granted
and are strictly enforced.0" The Department and the Common-
wealth Director of Public Prosecutions have sought on more
than one occasion to prosecute airlines departing after the com-
mencement of the curfew without a dispensation.10 6 While the
curfew and the granting of dispensations are strictly enforced,
the SACA also contains what might be termed "technical exemp-
103 Section 20 of the SACA provides that the "Minister may grant a dispensa-
tion [authorizing] an aircraft to take off from, or land at, Sydney Airport in cir-
cumstances that would otherwise contravene" the Act. Sydney Airport Curfew Act
1995 (Cth) s 20(1) (Austl.). In making the decision, "the Minister must have
regard to guidelines" regulating the granting of dispensations, including "what
constitutes exceptional circumstances" and "the conditions to which dispensa-
tions should be subject." Id. s 20(3), (5).
104 DEP'T OF INFRASTRUCTURE & REG'L DEv., GUIDELINES FOR THE GRANTING OF
DISPENSATIONS FOR AIRCRAFT TO USE SYDNEY AIRPORT DURING CURFEW HOURS IN
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES (Feb. 2013), available at http://www.infrastructure.
gov.au/aviation/environmental/curfews/SydneyAirport/DispensationGuide-
lines.aspx. Under sections 18 and 19 of the SACA, emergencies are considered
exceptional circumstances that warrant the grant of a dispensation. Sydney Airport
Curfew Act 1995 (Cth) ss 18-19 (Austl.).
105 See, e.g., DEP'T OF INFRASTRUCTURE & REG'L DEv., SYDNEY AIRPORT CURFEW
DISPENSATION REPORT #05/13 (2013), available at http://www.infrastructure.gov.
au/aviation/environmental/curfews/CurfewDispensationReports/2013/files/
Webreport_05_2013.pdf (describing the disapproval of several dispensation re-
quests, often on the ground that the "application did not meet the three
mandatory criteria required for issue of a curfew dispensation"); Henry Budd,
Why Some Flights Are Exempt from the Airport Curfew, AUSTRALIAN (Nov. 16, 2012,
12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/why-some-flights-are-ex-
empt-from-the-airport-curfew/story-e6frg6n6-1226517739772 (citing strict en-
forcement of the curfew and frequent rejection of dispensation requests).
106 Thai Airlines and Lauda Air faced fines of $10,000 in 1999 and 2000, re-
spectively. Harriet Alexander, Jetstar Flies into Storm over Curfew, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.smh.com.au/travel/travel-news/jetstar-flies-
into-storm-over-curfew-20090415-a7kf.html. In 2005, Gulf Air was fined $7,500
and $160,000 for two separate offenses. Id. In December 2007, Jetstar was fined
$148,500 for a breach of the curfew. Jetstar Cops Sydney Curfew Fine, SYDNEY MORN-
ING HERALD (May 5, 2009), http://www.smh.com.au/traveljetstar-cops-sydney-
durfew-fine-20090505-atuq.html.
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tions."' 7 Section 16 of the SACA, for example, provides that an
"aircraft may take off from Runway 16R" out over Botany Bay
during the curfew period if it receives a taxi clearance prior to
11:00 p.m."o
While the curfew is another artificial constraint on aircraft
movement at Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport, curfews are, more
often than not, a fact of life for major airports, or at least for
major airports located close to residential areas, as Sydney
Kingsford-Smith Airport is. As the Joint Study notes:
In relation to international services, the effects of the curfew at
Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport must be considered in the con-
text of curfews at other origin or destination airports. Where cur-
fews apply at the international destination airports as well, the
flexibility of an operation to accept different slot times will be
heavily constrained. For example, London's Heathrow Airport, a
key destination for Australian international traffic, also has a cur-
few from midnight to [6:00 a.m.] There is only a narrow period
where aircraft travelling on this route can depart from one air-
port, stop off en route and arrive before the curfew commences
at the destination. The alternative is for airlines to extend
ground time for aircraft at either airport, possibly having to park
overnight. This will impact on viability of the service, fleet utilisa-
tion and aircraft parking requirements. 09
Thus, a number of international airlines "run the gauntlet"
each night at Sydney Airport as they schedule departures close
to the start of the curfew to meet connecting flights in Asia and
the Middle East that will in turn arrive at European destinations
in the early morning.110 The prospect of having to park aircraft
in Sydney overnight in the event of delays has already prompted
Qatar Airways to refuse to fly to Sydney.'"
It may also be the case that curfew regimes are here to stay.
Both the National Aviation Policy White Paper and the Joint
107 See, e.g., Sydney Airport Cufew Act 1995 (Cth) s 16 (Austl.).
108 Id. The Act is silent on the time limits for departure beyond this point,
suggesting that an aircraft that receives taxi clearance prior to 11:00 p.m. may
actually take off from Runway 16R a significant period of time after the com-
mencement of the curfew. See id.
I0 JOINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 150.
110 See Budd, Why Some Flights Are Exempt from the Airport Cufew, supra note 105.
Ill Qatar Airways instead operates daily flights to Doha from Melbourne and
Perth. See Henry Budd, $600 Million Lost to Sydney Airport Curfew, AUSTRALAN
(Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/million-lost-to-sydney-
curfew/story-e6frg6n6-1226527047065.
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Study do not propose any change to the legislated curfew.'1 2 In-
deed, the White Paper suggests that the local communities
around Sydney, Adelaide, Gold Coast, and Essendon airports
"have grown in expectation of the curfew arrangements
continuing.""
V. THE WAY FORWARD
A. MEASURES To REDUCE THE EXISTING CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
AT SYDNEY KINGSFORD-SMITH AIRPORT
1. Increase the Movement Cap
The Joint Study "recommends that the Australian
[g]overnment initiate legislative amendments to the [SADMA]
to lift the statutory movement cap from [eighty] to [eighty-five]
movements per hour in the peak hours of [6:00 a.m. to 10:00
a.m.] and [3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.] each weekday to enable
greater rates of handling of peak hour traffic.""'
The Joint Study also notes that "in good weather conditions,
the parallel runway system [at Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport]
could physically cope with between [eighty-five] and [eighty-
seven] runway movements per hour, provided that taxiway and
gate capacity is available." 1 5
However, the Joint Study also notes that increasing the legis-
lated cap on hourly movements under the SADMA, while it
would "provide some additional capacity, .. . [would] not meet
the capacity gap in the medium and long term"; in fact, it would
"only provide a [6%] increase in the total slots available to be
allocated" during non-curfew hours.' 16 This translates to "ap-
proximately a [three-year] postponement of the impacts" of the
shortfall in aviation infrastructure capacity in Sydney.'" Never-
theless, the Joint Study suggests that any increase in the legis-
lated cap on hourly movements does not "address [ ] the real
pressure on availability of [peak-period] slots beyond the short
term.""'
112 Id. at 355; NATIONAL AVIATION POLICY WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 27.
113 NATIONAL AVIATION POLIcY WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 27. However,
sections 13 through 15 of the SACA "do not apply after [the] airport at Badgerys
Creek is available for night use." Sydney Airport Curfew Act 1995 (Cth) s 17 (Austl.).
114 JOINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 21.
115 Id. at 11.
116 Id. at 17.
117 Id. at 204.
118 Id. at 216.
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2. Regional Aviation, Minimum Aircraft Size, and a Move to
Bankstown
Over the course of a scheduling season, approximately 16% to
17% of the slots allocated at Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport are
allocated to NSW intrastate services," 9 but those services only
carry about 6% of total airport passengers. 120 As noted above,
most of these services are operated using aircraft that possess
between eighteen and eighty seats. 1 2 ' The Joint Study notes that
"[w] hile the protection of regional access is an important policy
objective, a large number of operations by small aircraft does
not represent an efficient use of limited airport capacity. "122 The
Joint Study therefore proposes movement to a policy of "pro-
gressive upgauging" of the smaller aircraft operating at Sydney
Kingsford-Smith Airport.1 2 3
The Joint Study states that "[r]emoving the regional ring
fence would allow immediate use of unallocated regional slots to
any operators (including domestic and international airlines)
seeking to operate new services." 24 The Joint Study also takes
the position that "[t]he restriction on allocation of a slot series
[under the SASMS] for new services with aircraft [containing]
less than [eighteen] seats could be extended to apply to larger
aircraft on a staged basis."' 2 5 The Joint Study estimates that if "a
[30%] reduction could be achieved in the number of move-
ments by aircraft with fewer than [forty] seats, this would be
equivalent to approximately [2%] of total airport slots. The im-
pacts of capacity pressures at Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport
could [therefore be] delayed by approximately one year."126
The Joint Study notes that to the extent that the removal of
the regional ring fence or the increase in the minimum number
of seats creates incentives to use larger aircraft for intrastate ser-
vices, they may encourage a reduction in the number of services,
if not seat numbers.12 7 They may also encourage the "operation
119 Id. at 219.
120 Id. at 205.
121 Id. at 220 tbl. 28.
122 Id. at 220.
123 Id. at 223.
124 Id. at 222.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 223.
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of smaller aircraft into another airport in the region, such as
Bankstown Airport."128
On this second point, the Joint Study suggests that "Bank-
stown Airport could be upgraded and made available to accom-
modate a limited level of operations by turboprop Regular
Public Transport (RPT) aircraft." 129 This would be subject to the
existing general aviation operations conducted from Bankstown,
as well as any need for "upgrades of airport and road access
infrastructure.
3. Permit Increased Aircraft Movements During Curfew Shoulders
The previous Commonwealth government's 2009 National
Aviation Policy White Paper stated that "the Government is
firmly committed to maintaining the . . . airport curfew . .. at
Sydney Kingsford Smith Airport."13 1 The Joint Study acknowl-
edges that this position has had bipartisan political support for a
number of years and does not assess it further; the study instead
focuses on issues regarding the curfew shoulder settings.3 2
As noted above, the Sydney Airport Curfew Act allows a small
number of movements during the shoulder periods: up to a
maximum of thirty-five weekly arrivals between 5:00 a.m. and
6:00 a.m., and up to a maximum of fourteen movements be-
tween 11:00 p.m. and midnight, or to such lower levels as set out
in the regulations.13 The regulations currently set the limit at
no more than twenty-four movements per week between 5:00
a.m. and 6:00 a.m., and zero movements between 11:00 p.m.
and midnight.' Under this arrangement, the maximum num-
ber of aircraft movements under curfew shoulder levels "is
equivalent to 2,548 movements per year," compared to the cur-
rently regulated level of 1,248 movements per year.'3 5
The Joint Study notes that "[a]llowing movements in the
morning shoulder period ([5:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m.]) to the maxi-
mum limit permitted under the curfew legislation would only
add 0.1% in available slots, although it would assist in clearing
128 Id.
129 Id. at 240.
130 Id.
131 NATIONAL AVIATION POLICY WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 192.
132 JOINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 149.
13 Sydney Airport Curfew Act 1995 (Cth) s 12(8)-(9) (Austl.).
134 See Sydney Airport Curfew Regulations 1995 (Cth) regs 6-7 (Austl.).
135 JOINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 217.
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the morning international peak arrivals."se Additionally,
"[a]llowing movements in the evening shoulder period would
have even less impact on the capacity gap, as there are [fewer]
slots available under the Sydney Airport Curfew Act 1995 as
compared to the morning shoulder."'3 7 Overall, the Joint Study
notes that a proposed change to movements in the curfew shoul-
der in this regard would likely delay capacity issues for aircraft
accessing Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport by less than one year,
and as such "may not warrant further consideration.'13 8
4. Land Reclamation
As land becomes scarcer, airports are increasingly being built
or planned to be built on land reclaimed from water. Hong
Kong International Airport was built on reclaimed land on Chek
Lap Kok Island, near the larger Lantau Island in Hong Kong's
New Territories, and opened in 1998.189 Osaka Kansai Airport
was built on an artificial island in the middle of Osaka Bay.14 0
Other major cities, such as London, are considering the con-
struction of offshore airports to tackle existing capacity issues.'
Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport is no different in this regard.
It is located adjacent to the Port of Botany Bay, and a third run-
way was built entirely on reclaimed land from that area in
1994.142 The Joint Study examines options that had previously
been raised for land reclamation or expansion.1 4 3 Proposed ad-
ditional runways or a new airport at the area near Kurnell,
southwest of the current airport, were ruled out as "prohibitively
expensive" and "hav[ing a] major environmental impact[ ].""1'
In the same vein, the Joint Study notes that an offshore airport
in the vicinity of Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport has been
136 Id. at 344.
137 Id. (emphasis omitted).
138 Id. at 219.
13 Hong Kong International Airport-Introduction, CIVCAL, http://civcal.media.
hku.hk/airport/introduction/default.htm (last visited May 22, 2014).
-4 Kansai International Airport Terminal, ARCHITRAVEL (Jan. 1, 2013), http://
www.architravel.com/architravel/building/Kansai-international-airport-
terminal/.
1 THE THAMES ESTUARY RESEARCH & DEV. Co., LONDON JUBILEE INTERNA-
TIONAL AIRPORT 3 (2012), available at http://testrad.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/
2012/11/LJIAFINAL.pdf.
142 JOINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 10.
'4 Id. at 206.
144 Id. at 204.
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"ruled out ... [because] the expense and potential environmen-
tal impact would exceed those of the Kurnell options."1 4 5
5. Peak-Period Pricing
An area not examined by the Joint Study is the potential of
using peak-period (or congestion) pricing. One commentator
notes:
Under such a system, the landing fees paid by airlines . .. would
vary with the level of congestion at the airport. Operating costs at
peak hours would then rise substantially compared to off-peak
costs, leading to a redistribution of traffic as airlines shift some
flights away from the peak. The result would be a decline in air-
port congestion, reducing the number of delays.' 6
Under the Commonwealth government's Aeronautical Pric-
ing Principles,"' "at airports with significant capacity con-
straints, [peak-period] pricing is allowed where necessary to
efficiently manage demand and promote efficient investment in
and use of airport infrastructure.""" This principle has particu-
lar relevance to Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport, considering it
is Australia's most congested airport.1 4 9 However, in allowing
peak pricing in order to "promote efficient investment in and
use of airport infrastructure," the principle also assumes that
Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport has room to grow.15 0 The previ-
ous section of this article concludes that this is not the case. 15 1
Any peak-period pricing is also affected by the regional ring
fence provisions. As noted above, all regional services-regard-
less of whether they are provided during the peak or off-peak
period-are subject to a price cap. 1 5 2 The price cap in this case
145 Id. at 208.
146 Jan K. Brueckner, Internalization of Airport Congestion, 8 J. AIR TRANSPORT
MGMT. 141, 141 (2002).
147 "The Aeronautical Pricing Principles relate to prices for aeronautical ser-
vices and facilities." Productivity Comm'n, Productivity Commission Report-Review
of Price Regulation of Airport Services, PETER COSTELLO (Apr. 30, 2007), http://www.
petercostello.com.au/press/2007/3113-productivity-commission-report-review-
of-price-regulation-of-airport-services. The principles originated with the PC's
first report on the price regulation of airport services in 2002 and were amended
over time, including after the PC's second report into the price regulation of




151 See supra Part I.
152 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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is limited to increases each year at the level of the CPI.15 1 It is
not completely clear what level of discretion Sydney Kingsford-
Smith Airport would have with regard to implementing peak-
period pricing under the regional air service price caps.'
6. Dehubbing
Another area not examined by the Joint Study is the concept
of "dehubbing" Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport. As noted
above, Qantas has its primary domestic and international hubs
for its Australian operations at Sydney Kingsford-Smith Air-
port.'15 One of the consequences of this is that Sydney Kings-
ford-Smith Airport is cluttered by the connecting traffic of
passengers arriving in Sydney from domestic or international
destinations in order to connect to third destinations.1 5 ' Analysis
presented in the Joint Study suggests that "connecting passen-
gers accounted for approximately [20%] of passenger move-
ments at Sydney (Kingsford-Smith) Airport in 2010."'"5 Of that,
just over half was accounted for by domestic and regional pas-
senger connections (approximately 2.5 million movements).'5
Luis Zambrano advocates a "policy of developing 'reliever' air-
ports to receive all traffic that is 'connecting-only.' "15' He notes
153 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
154 In the UK,
airport price caps only limit the level of a basket of airport charges.
They leave the airports with the freedom to rebalance the structure
of charges across different services[,] . . . charged through the fol-
lowing categories: landing, passenger, . . . and aircraft parking
charges. Within these categories, the charges may vary according to
the time of day, across different days and months, and across differ-
ent seasons. For example, [Heathrow Airports Holdings (formerly
BAA)] levies a different landing charge in peak, shoulder and off-
peak times at Heathrow.
CIVIL AvIATION AUTH., PEAK PRICING AND ECONOMic REGULATION ANNEX 1 (2001),
available at http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/5/ergdocs/annexpp.pdf.
155 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
156 SeeJOINT STUDv, supra note 7, at 185. These originating services might be
regional services connecting in Sydney to other Australian or international desti-
nations (e.g., a flight from Dubbo in regional NSW to Los Angeles connecting
through Sydney), or services from other major Australian airports connecting to
international services only offered through Sydney (e.g., Melbourne to Vancou-
ver flying with Air Canada via Sydney).
157 Id. at 116.
158 Id. at 186.
159 Luis G. Zambrano, Comment, Balancing the Rights of Landowners with the
Needs of Airports: The Continuing Battle over Noise, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 445, 492
(2000).
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that "[c]onnecting passengers do not have to be routed to air-
ports in high population density areas because the connections
are only temporary stops along the route to the final destina-
tion. The location of the stops is immaterial to the traveller."16 0
There is some precedent for airlines significantly reducing
services from their former hub airports, although these airports
and their surroundings have distinctly different demographic
and economic characteristics in comparison to Sydney Kings-
ford-Smith Airport and its surrounding environment."6 " "The
partial or complete abandonment of a hub by the dominant car-
rier is known as 'dehubbing' . . . and refers to the process of
dismantling the structure of connections offered by the hub air-
line."' 6 2 Any dehubbing process at Sydney Kingsford-Smith Air-
port would require a fundamental shift in Qantas's business
strategy and most likely an incentive in the form of compensa-
tion. However, a recent OECD report notes:
A major attraction of gateway airports for both passengers and
airlines is that frequent services to these major airports facilitate
direct connections . . . . Such interconnections in turn allow im-
proved travel time choices and better network performance. For
these important commercial reasons, the major airline carriers
hold on tightly to their airport slots and are loath indeed to move
away from major gateway airports, even with compensation.1 63
In any event, it is arguable that the construction of a second
Sydney airport would lead to a natural reduction in time- and
location-sensitive air services to Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport,
such as low-cost carrier operations, because they would be trans-
ferred to the lower charging second Sydney airport.
B. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SECOND SYDNEY AIRPORT
As the Joint Study notes, while a number of the measures
listed above could be implemented in order to more efficiently
use Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport's existing infrastructure,
160 Id.
161 See Renato Redondi et al., De-Hubbing of Airports and Their Recovery Patterns,
18J. AIR TRANSPORT MGMT. 1, 4 (2012). Reductions in services have been made
by US Airways at Pittsburgh International Airport, Delta at Cincinnati/Northern
Kentucky International Airport, and United/Continental at Cleveland Hopkins
International Airport. Id. British Airways also dehubbed from Gatwick Airport in
2000, but Gatwick was a secondary hub developed by British Airways in the face of
capacity constraints at London Heathrow Airport. Id.
162 Id. at 1.
163 OECD, supra note 15, at 131.
2014] 61
JOURNAL OF AIR IAW AND COMMERCE
they "would delay by [only] a few years the worst impacts of the
forecast capacity shortfall."1 6 4 As such, "they do not represent
solutions for the long term." 6 The following sections address
the Sydney aviation capacity issue at the more fundamental level
of the need for new infrastructure.
1. Construction of a High-Speed Rail Link
The debate over the construction of a high-speed rail (HSR)
system in Australia has gone on for almost as long as the second
Sydney airport debate. The potential construction of an HSR
link regularly forms a part of the second Sydney airport debate.
The Premier of NSW recently put forward the NSW govern-
ment's view that Canberra Airport, with an HSR link to Sydney,
could act as Sydney's second airport.16 1
The promotion of Canberra as a second airport for Sydney
would seem to limit any monopoly pricing concerns that would
otherwise have arisen were Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport to
exercise its right of first refusal over the construction of a sec-
ond Sydney airport under the airport sale agreement.
However, the most recent study into HSR has estimated the
capital cost of constructing an HSR link between Sydney and
Canberra at AUD $23 billion (in 2012 dollars). I" This compares
unfavorably with the approximate, high-level indicative costs of
the construction of a Type 1 full-service international airport in
the Sydney Basin, quoted in the Joint Study as ranging from
AUD $7 billion to $11 billion.'16
In any event, the Joint Study suggests that "[t] he current con-
sideration of a future east coast [HSR] system linking Sydney to
other major cities does not remove the need to provide addi-
tional aviation capacity," and "HSR will not address many of the
key drivers for aviation growth at Sydney (Kingsford-Smith)
Airport.""
16 JOINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 17.
165 Id.
166 Jacob Saulwick & Kelsey Munro, O'Farrell Calls for High-Speed Trains Instead of
Second Sydney Airport, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.smh.
com.au/nsw/ofarrell-calls-for-highspeed-trains-instead-of-second-sydney-airport-
20110405-ld2zj.html.
167 AECOM, HIGH SPEED RAIL STUDY-PHASE 2 REPORT 21 tbl. ES-7 (2013),
available at http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/rail/trains/high-speed/files/HSR
Phase_2-MainReportLowRes.pdf.
168 SeeJoINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 324.
169 Id. at 5.
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2. Potential Locations for a Second Sydney Airport
In its 442 pages, the Joint Study provides an extensive exami-
nation of all the potential sites for a second Sydney airport. The
Joint Study settled on Badgerys Creek (with areas already previ-
ously acquired by the Commonwealth government for an air-
port)'7 0 as "the best site for the development of a supplementary
airport within the Sydney basin."1 7 1 This determination was
made despite the previous Commonwealth government's state-
ment in the National Aviation Policy White Paper in 2009 that:
The development of an integrated planning approach to examin-
ing future Sydney region airport capacity does not support the
construction of an airport at Badgerys Creek. Badgerys Creek is
no longer an option. It has been overtaken by years of urban
growth in the area and is inconsistent with future NSW spatial
planning and land use development for the south-west region of
Sydney. 172
When the Joint Study was released in March 2012, the previ-
ous Commonwealth government remained consistent with its
views in the National Aviation Policy White Paper, electing to
conduct a scoping study of Wilton, the site identified as the next
best alternative to Badgerys Creek.17 1 In May 2013, the final re-
port of the scoping study was released. 174 The study concluded
that while the development of an airport at Wilton was possible
and could provide significant economic benefits to the commu-
nity, it would present engineering and environmental chal-
lenges and would involve considerable costs. 175
170 Id. at 327 ("In 1986, following an extensive site selection process, the Aus-
tralian Government announced that a location at Badgerys Creek, west of Syd-
ney's CBD, had been chosen as the site for a second major airport for Sydney. A
site of approximately 1,700 hectares was subsequently acquired between 1986 and
1991. Since that time urban growth has continued in the areas surrounding the
site.").
11 Id. at 326.
172 NATIONAL AVIATION POLICY WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 193.
17 Transcript ofPress Conference-Sydney, ANTHONY ALBANESE MP (Mar. 2, 2012),
http://anthonyalbanese.com.au/transcript-of-press-conference-sydney-2.
174 DEP'T OF INFRASTRUCTURE & REG'L DEV., A STUDY OF WILTON AND RAAF
BASE RICHMOND FOR CIVIL AvIATION OPERATION (2013), available at http://www.
infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/airport/westernsydney/scopingstudy/files/A
study-of WiltonandRichmondforcivilaviation-operations.pdf.
175 Id. at 14-15.
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C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The federal elections in September 2013 brought a change of
government in Australia.1 7 6 The Liberal-National coalition, now
the new majority party in federal Parliament (and the new Com-
monwealth government), set forth its official position on a sec-
ond Sydney airport in a publication on aviation policy released
prior to the election. The publication stated that a decision
on a second airport would be made during the new govern-
ment's first term.1 78
On April 15, 2014, the Commonwealth government an-
nounced that the site for the second Sydney airport would be at
Badgerys Creek.1 79 At the same time, the government an-
nounced a new "Sydney Aviation Strategy" to deal with the de-
velopment of the new airport.18 0 The government has stated that
planning for the airport will start immediately and that construc-
tion should start by 2016.181 The new airport would see its first
flight, and be fully operational, in the middle of the next
decade. 182
In one sense, the government's decision has brought this
long-running debate to a close. However, given the terms of cer-
tain agreements with Sydney Kingsford-Smith Airport, issues sur-
rounding monopoly infrastructure remain.1 8 3 The length of the
debate should also raise questions among government policy-
176 See Australia Election: Tony Abbott Defeats Kevin Rudd, BBC NEWS (Sept. 7,
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-24000133.
177 LIBERAL PARTY OF AuSTL., THE COALITION POLICY FOR AvIATION § 7.b
(2013), available at http://lpaweb-static.s3.amazonaws.com/Coalition%202013
%20Election%2OPolicy%20%E2%80%93%2OAviation%20%E2%80%93%20final
.pdf.
178 Id. The policy was further clarified to make it clear that a decision would
not be made before the release of the Sydney Airport Master Plan in December
2013. See Jane Norman, Second Sydney Airport Site to Be Identified Within Months,
Deputy PM Warren Truss Says, ABC NEWS, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-
11/second-sydney-airport-site-to-be-identified-in-months/5016174 (last updated
Feb. 5, 2014, 1:30 PM). As noted above, the Sydney Airport Master Plan is a docu-
ment that Sydney Airport is required to produce and update at five-year intervals
under the Airports Act. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
179 Press Release, Minister for Infrastructure & Reg'1 Dev., Western Sydney Air-
port to Deliver Jobs and Infrastructure (Apr. 15, 2014), available at http://www.
minister.infrastructure.gov.au/wt/releases/2014/April/wt056_2014.aspx.
180 The Australian Government's Sydney Aviation Strategy, DEPARTMENT INFRASTRUC-
TURE & REGIONAL DEV., http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/airport/west
ern-sydney/ (last updated May 14, 2014).
181 Press Release, Minister for Infrastructure & Reg'1 Dev., supra note 179.
182 Id.
183 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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makers, academia, and the private sector as to how in the future
Australia intends to fund its infrastructure deficit across a num-
ber of areas. It will not always be the case that most of the cost
will be able to "be met by a private sector operator."1 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The common threads in the second Sydney airport debate
have been the intrusion of politics into the decision-making pro-
cess and, at the same time, a prevailing view in the Common-
wealth government that since privatization, airport
infrastructure is no longer a public infrastructure concern.
The second Sydney Airport debate has been a victim of politi-
cal considerations since its very beginnings in 1946. These politi-
cal considerations have in turn created a policy lacuna. The
second Sydney airport debate is a politically driven process be-
cause it has become a politically charged decision involving mul-
tiple stakeholders: from airport owners, to voters in marginal
electorates, to the members of Parliament representing those
electorates.
Political considerations have resulted in the demand manage-
ment system, the regional ring fence, and the curfew at Sydney
Kingsford-Smith Airport.'8 5 The implementation of those sys-
tems and limitations on operations has in turn affected Sydney
Kingsford-Smith Airport's ability to operate at its full capacity
and has hastened the debate over the need for a second Sydney
airport.'8 6
The Sydney airport situation suggests that governments
should take heed of the lessons of infrastructure development.
The longer it takes to make a decision, the more costly it will
eventually be, in terms of both dollars and electoral votes.18 7
184 See Press Release, Minister for Infrastructure & Reg'l Dev., supra note 179.
185 JOINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 212.
186 See id.
187 This is made clear by the HSR example. The first serious proposal for an
HSR link in Australia was in 1984; the cost of a link between Sydney, Melbourne,
and Canberra was estimated at AUD $2.5 billion (later revised to AUD $4 bil-
lion). Paula Williams, Australian Very Fast Trains-A Chronology, PARLIAMENT
AuSTL. (Apr. 6, 1998), http://www.aph.gov.au/AboutParliament/Parliamen-
taryDepartments/ParliamentaryLibrary/PublicationsArchive/Background
Papers/bp9798/98bpl6. This compares with the quoted capital costs of con-
structing an HSR link today (between Sydney and Canberra only) of AUD $23
billion. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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Australia suffers from an "infrastructure deficit."' This in-
cludes a deficit in airport infrastructure. A failure to meet the
projected demand for air travel in Sydney in the future will go
far beyond the cost of building the second airport itself. As the
Joint Study notes, "[a] shortfall in airport capacity, if unad-
dressed, would inevitably lead to substantial economic costs and
loss of productivity."189 Passengers would experience higher
airfares and greater difficulty finding seats, and businesses
would seek to relocate their operations to more accessible
locations.
Other countries and regions have placed a higher priority on
unlocking the benefits that aviation and transport can bring to
an economy. In China and the Middle East, aviation planning
and government planning are in lockstep. The Civil Aviation
Administration of China recently announced approval for the
construction of a second Beijing airport by 2018 with a planned
capacity for 70 million passengers per year by 2025.90 The de-
velopment of Dubai International Airport has been comple-
mented by the construction of Al Maktoum International
Airport, which will have a capacity of 160 million passengers per
year.9 ' Even Turkey is planning a new airport in Istanbul (the
city's third airport providing international flights) with an initial
handling capacity of 90 million passengers per year.' 9 2
In contrast, since the privatization of Australia's airports,
there seems to be a view that airport infrastructure is no longer
the financial concern of government." Until there is some re-
188 OECD, OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: AUsTRALIA 91 (2010), available at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/ecosurveys-aus-2010-en.
189 JOINT STUDY, supra note 7, at 13. By 2060, the Joint Study estimates that "the
economy-wide (direct and flow-on) impacts across all sectors could total $59.5
billion in foregone expenditure and $34.0 billion in foregone gross domestic
product." Id. at 13. The Joint Study also estimates that "the economic and social
benefits of some 54 million passenger movements per year and more than
760,000 tonnes of air freight per year will be foregone" if no additional capacity is
added. Id. at 184. The "cumulative impact" of passenger movements foregone is
"expected to be as high as [$]665 million . . . between 2035 and 2060." Id.
190 Mavis Toh, Chinese Government Approves Construction of Second Beijing Airport,
FLIGHTGLOBAL (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/chi-
nese-govemment-approves-construction-of-second-beijing-airport-380974/.
191 Al Maktoum International Airport, DUBA WORLD CENT., http://www.dwc.ae/
project-details/al-maktoum-intemational-airport/ (last visited May 20, 2014).
192 Ali Berat Meric & Ercan Ersoy, Turkey Calls Bids for New $9 Billion Airport to
Boost Capacity, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2013-01-23/turkey-calls-bids-for-new-9-billion-airport-to-boost-capacity.html.
193 In fact, the airline industry group IATA suggests the privatization trend has
seen the aviation industry treated like a "cash cow" for governments. See Press
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calibration in this regard, Sydney will continue to suffer the
flow-on effects of its shortfall in airport infrastructure across a
number of areas, given its place as Australia's prime interna-
tional center for business and finance, a major tourist destina-
tion, and an international gateway.
Release, IATA, Remarks of Tony Tyler at ICAO Air Transport Symposium, Mon-
treal (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/Pages/2012-04-
18-01.aspx. Even after privatization, governments have levied taxes on the indus-
try that go straight to general revenues. Id.
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